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INTRODUCTION
Human reliability analysis (HRA) originated as a subfield of human factors. The earliest HRA methods attempted to predict human performance probabilistically (Swain, Altman, and Rook, 1963) , an approach which was backed by early efforts to catalog human errors from military and other applications for the purposes of quantitative prediction (Rigby, 1967) . Meister (2004) has suggested that HRA filled an important void in the early science of human factors. Whereas much of human factors was diagnostic-designed to identify shortcomings in built systems and ultimately to make design recommendations-HRA remained predictive, attempting to anticipate how systems might degrade human performance.
This early distinction between human factors as a diagnostic science and HRA as a prescriptive science was cemented by the engineering disciplines to which human factors and HRA aligned themselves. Human factors initially provided design guidance for military applications but gradually became involved in industry applications and ultimately consumer productsmirroring the transfer of technology in the second half of the twentieth century. By the 1980s, consumer product design regularly featured usability engineering, usercentered design, and human-computer interaction elements.
In contrast, HRA started and remained closely aligned with safety-critical applications for which human error had the potential to have high consequences. Like human factors, HRA was initially closely aligned to military applications, namely nuclear weapons manufacturing and handling safety. However, by the early 1980s (Swain and Guttman, 1983) , HRA was closely associated with the nuclear power industry, an association maintained to this day. HRA emerged parallel with the development of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975) for the safety certification primarily of as-built plant designs.
More recently, coinciding with the modernization of existing nuclear power plants-especially main control rooms-and the construction of new plants, there has been a strong movement to reconsider the use of HRA solely in a verification role for as-built systems. New guidance has been proposed within the nuclear industry (O'Hara et al., 2004) , suggesting a tighter integration of HRA with human factors design activities. Additional research (Boring et al., in press; Boring and Bye, 2008; Boring, 2007) has clarified the opportunities to utilize HRA to inform design and realign itself with core human factors work. In practice, however, the application of HRA for design, both inside and outside the nuclear industry, remains a largely untested principle.
RESEARCH PROJECT

Background
As part of general reorganization at Ringhals Nuclear Power Station (Ringhals) in 2008, the technical competence in HRA was transferred from the Ringhals Safety Analysis (RTAS) department to the Ringhals Human Performance (RQH) department. This transfer brought with it two significant changes:
 the departmental decoupling of HRA from PRA  the merger of the HRA technical competence with human performance activities in RQH to evaluate those challenges and provide concise guidance on how to maximize the collaboration between human performance and HRA capabilities at the plant. This paper summarizes the findings of the survey and provides initial guidance for integrating HRA into the human factors design process. The design process highlighted in this paper centers on main control room upgrades, for example the replacement of analog instrumentation and control systems with their digital descendants. Future papers will address other design activities that are relevant to the plant.
Method
We interviewed 23 Swedish nuclear power plant specialists, with research, practitioner, and regulatory expertise in HRA, PRA, human-system integration, and human performance. The interviews centered on a variety of possible applications for HRA, with an emphasis on identifying needs and gaps toward a more complete utilization of HRA expertise and methods at the home plant.
Purpose
This paper takes previous explorations of HRA for design one step further by conducting a user needs analysis on opportunities for using HRA in main control room modernizations. The product of the user needs analysis is a concrete set of HRA design principles. While this paper stops short of providing a proof-ofconcept example for HRA in the design process in the nuclear industry, the guidance nonetheless provides concrete requirements and a blueprint for HRA as a design tool.
FINDINGS
Current Process
In the design of new systems or upgrades of older systems, HRA has mainly been used as a validation tool. In this capacity, HRA ensures that reactor safety is not compromised by the new design or the upgrade. In order to pass the validation, the level of reactor safety has to be demonstrably at least as good as it was before the change. At this late stage in system development, if any performance issues are detected, these would actually be difficult to rectify, and it would take a significant failure of the system to force redesigns. Many of the human factors and HRA experts are brought in as contractors late in the project, i.e. in the verification or validation phase. As such, these experts do not have any opportunity to influence the design. If HRA had been used earlier in the process, as NUREG-0711 (O'Hara et al., 2004) suggests, negative design impacts on operator performance could be detected at a stage where there still would be time to make changes. The design process in all major upgrade and modernization projects at Ringhals is based on NUREG-0711, but all projects have modified the process to fit their own needs and work processes. In practice, these modifications have relegated HRA to a tail-end activity.
Principles for HRA Use in Design
In order to gain synergies and to improve the contributions of both human factors and HRA in upgrade and modernization projects at the plant, common goals must be identified. These goals must give guidance to which information both fields could provide to each other to make the final design safer and more reliable. The following guidelines are derived from suggestions provided by plant experts in the interviews. These guidelines provide a framework in which HRA can actively contribute to design projects, but also a mechanism for integrating the human factors and HRA work at Ringhals.
Principle 1-Early Implementation Rather than Late Verification
HRA needs to be implemented earlier in the design phase instead of at the system verification phase. In this way, it may influence the system design rather than serve simply as a tool to verify the quality of a design. In a worst case scenario, post-design verification may only serve to nullify a design that has been in development for years and cannot practically be altered. A better approach, therefore, is to develop qualitative insights from HRA in the form of identifying system designs and configurations that would decrease the likelihood of operator errors. Further, quantitative estimates may determine the likelihood and consequence of particular operator errors, thereby allowing a ranking of competing design concepts linked to particular classes of errors.
Even though we argue that HRA should be implemented earlier in the design process, HRA should, of course, continue to be used in the verification phase. HRA can determine different testing scenarios, which can be used for validation of the system or design. The same scenarios are also used in the baseline analysis, which is one of the first human factors activities in a project. The baseline analysis documents operator performance in using the current design. These results are later compared with the analysis results in the verification phase in order to conclude that reactor safety has not been compromised. Therefore, the scenarios have to be the same in both the baseline and the validation analyses. To determine the scenarios before the baseline analysis is conducted, HRA should be incorporated very early in the design process. In the case of significant modernizations such as a complete main control room upgrade, it is insufficient to rely on operator action tables provide by the PRA or by the vendors. These operator action tables are often legacy documents based on operating experience. They may not, therefore, fully anticipate operator actions or inactions in the face of new human-machine interface technology.
Principle 2-Tailored HRA Methods for Design
Currently, there is a strong emphasis on a one-size-fitsall approach to HRA. The HRA analyses conducted at Ringhals are based on the THERP method (Swain and Guttman, 1983) . The main reason behind this is the ease of utilizing the human error probability tables provided in the THERP documentation. Another, almost as important reason is the fact that the regulatory body has historically accepted THERP as the HRA methodology used in practice at the plants. Neither Ringhals nor the vendors would like to invest in an HRA if they are unsure that the regulatory body would approve the method's findings. While THERP is a suitable and comprehensive HRA method for contemporary applications, its suitability for modern human-machine interfaces has not been established. Barring a significant update to bring THERP into alignment with new control room technologies, it is necessary to consider newer HRA methods.
Despite these uncertainties over the suitability of the dominant HRA method, there is a more fundamental issue at hand: it should not be necessary to use the same method for all analyses conducted at the plant. Instead, the plant should use methods and analyses that are tailored for specific applications. Not all applications have the need to be analyzed by a complex and resource consuming method. The analyst should choose a method, or type of analysis, that suits the purpose of the application. This statement does not mean that all available HRA methods should be used. There are too many methods available to make that feasible. Instead, a consolidation or harmonizing of methods needs to be conducted to ensure consistent results.
HRA work at Ringhals is moving toward more prospective analyses, and a few prospective HRAs have been conducted so far to anticipate and prevent sources of human error. The prospective approach for gleaning error insights is much the same as used for the retrospective HRA investigations of plant events, i.e., interviews and expert judgment. The prospective HRA approach can easily be adapted to design applications-the predictive nature of HRA lends itself well to making recommendations about safe courses of activity and to prioritizing those recommendations when considering design alternatives.
Nonetheless, such a framework of using HRA prospectively should not be linked to any specific method. Instead, like the general-purpose guidance in the PRA Standard (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2009) or the Good Practices for Implementing HRA (Kolaczkowski et al., 2005) , the optimal process of using prospective HRA for design should be method independent. Such method-independent guidance for the implementation of prospective HRA for design has notto date-been completed.
Principle 3-Scalable HRA
Closely related to the previous principle, it is important that HRA be scalable to fit the application at hand. For example, a complete, detailed task analysis for purposes of an HRA may not be practicable at the early design phase of a modernization project. There may be knowledge limitations on operator tasking prior to completion of the design specification, which may compound with time and budget constraints. A simplified task analysis may therefore be necessary to identify only the most critical operator actions for purposes of evaluation. HRA commonly offers simplified (e.g., screening) and detailed analysis approaches. The need for different levels of analysis is not diminished when considering operator performance on newly designed systems, and HRA for design should scale to the level of analysis required.
Principle 4-Better Use of Qualitative HRA
There is disagreement on the value of the qualitative information provided by HRA. Presently, at least two documents regarding the qualitative parts of the HRAthe Methodology Description and the Results Report-are produced in each HRA at Ringhals. Some more seasoned PRA analysts have tended to view the main value in HRA coming from the quantitative values in the form of human error probabilities. Younger analysts in the interviews, however, tended also to see value in qualitative insights. The younger analysts' view concurs with that of the Swedish regulator. The regulator views qualitative insights as important for tracing the root cause in retrospective analyses. This qualitative result also needs to be thoroughly documented to make the HRA traceable and usable by reviewers or other safety personnel.
At Ringhals, retrospective human factors investigations are conducted regularly. These investigations are sometimes viewed as being too qualitative, because the receiver of the investigation is mainly someone within a technical engineering department. Employees in the technical departments do not generally work with qualitative measures and can therefore have a hard time relating to the results of the investigations. As noted previously, HRA is closely related to PRA but has human factors roots. Therefore HRA could serve as a bridge between the psychological and engineering work at the plant. Having quantitative results from HRA, as a part of the retrospective investigation, could be helpful in the communication of the results and recommendations. Retrospective investigations often have multiple recommendations for which the receiver should ultimately take responsibility to address. Having multiple recommendations could make it difficult to know where to start and to understand which recommendations are the most important ones. HRA could ease this selection process by providing qualitative or quantitative results suitable for ranking or prioritization of the recommendations.
The importance of qualitative information becomes even more evident in the prospective analyses required for design. Quantitative HRA measures may, technically speaking, be adequate to populate the PRA model. However, for design work, the true value comes from HRA's determination of possible contributors to degraded operator performance-not from the ability of HRA to generate human error probabilities. HRA affords the ability to determine root causes of many possible operator errors, thereby allowing system designers to determine ways to prevent those errors. A tertiary approach may be taken to address those errors-procedures may be written or clarified, specialized operator training may be offered, or the system may be redesigned to prevent the error. Understanding the causes of the possible operator error is key to developing the best of these strategies to minimize the error recurrence.
Principle 5-HRA Design Acceptance Criteria
Contemporary HRA includes a significant quantitative element that is used in risk-informed decision making. This framework can and should be extended to establish operator performance thresholds for novel control room designs. The goal thereby is to model performance deficits and know their effects a priori on system safety. Such safety limits are already understood from the verification and validation phase of system design, but they must be adapted for use early in the system design. HRA verification criteria may consider overall performance as a product of hardware and human actions. As noted in the interviews, there is the danger that the system may have automated second-checking and correction such that operators may not ever become fully aware of errors they have committed. Such a system precludes the opportunity for the operators to learn from their errors, resulting in the potential for the operators to commit the error repeatedly. While in the advanced system, this error may have negligible consequences in a particular context, the situational awareness of the operators is nevertheless compromised such that the missed error may resurface in another context that actually has direct consequences on the safety of the plant. For design applications, it is therefore crucial that HRA help identify the potential for both low and high consequence errors in operator actions. In cases where high consequence errors are identified, HRA should provide design guidance to minimize their occurrence in addition to standard design practice to mitigate the effects of those errors through hardware and software systems.
Principle 6-HRA Sensitivity to Human-Machine Interface Issues
Legacy HRA methods may not provide a nuanced account of the issues affecting operators in modern interfaces. Even many newer HRA methods are loosely based on older methods and may not have expanded the fundamental performance shaping factors or generic error types that are the basis for the qualitative and quantitative analyses. In the realm of HRA for design, however, it is crucial that the methods adequately address digital instrumentation and controls, advanced displays, and increased opportunity for automation, so that they can help the analyst to predict where related deficits might occur. It may be necessary to develop new HRA methods or tools that are attuned to advanced technologies, e.g., to marry HRA methods with advanced usability checklists (Boring et al., 2006) . Such an HRA approach must help anticipate sources of operator error endemic to advanced technologies and be sensitive to design factors such as the usability of interface technologies or the consistency of interface elements provided by different vendors.
DISCUSSION
Clearly, the foregoing discussion is not an exhaustive list of principles to guide the transition of HRA to support plant upgrades and design projects at Ringhals or other plants. This list does, however, represent six concrete changes that must be adopted in order for HRA to make a more complete contribution to the design process. Such a contribution is highly desirable, as evidenced across the spectrum of interviews, because HRA is seen as a potentially useful tool to predict design issues that might negatively affect operator performance and decrease plant safety. Incorporating HRA as another tool in the design process ultimately provides the opportunity to design a system that is more robust or resilient to operator error.
An important byproduct of implementing HRA in the design process is the potential to reduce costly redesigns that are necessitated by findings during the verification phase. HRA, along with human factors, must in the future anticipate many problems before they are implemented into the system design. This requirement accords well with the prescriptive and predictive nature of HRA.
Additionally, as mentioned, HRA may prioritize the safest among competing design alternatives. Prioritization may serve another end: where limited resources are available for verification during the design phase, HRA may pinpoint the most important areas for using costly humans-in-the-loop validation testing. Testing may be focused in those areas where safety or operator reliability may in any way come into question.
It next falls upon the authors to implement these six principles and to validate the assumptions presented in this paper. Work is currently underway to adapt HRA to meet these requirements. More importantly, the authors plan to introduce HRA for design as part of a forthcoming upgrade effort at Ringhals. This example in practice will serve as the litmus test for the approach and will be presented in future papers. Of particular interest is the extent to which HRA adds value to the design process. Additionally, it will be interesting to note if HRA's contribution to design will reconcile it with the aims of its sibling field, human factors.
